Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo (AIR 2011 SC 1952)

Facts of the Case

This case involved a jurisdictional conflict over the custody of Kush, an 11-year-old U.S. citizen born in America.

• Parents: Both parents were of Indian origin. The mother (appellant) resided with her parents in Delhi. The father (respondent) was in the U.S.

• Foreign Proceedings: The father filed for divorce and custody in an American court. The Superior Court of California issued an order that led to a red corner notice being issued against the mother for child abduction.

• Indian Proceedings: The mother filed for custody under the Guardians and Wards Act in the Delhi District Court, which granted her interim custody in April 2009.

• High Court Decision: The father challenged this in the Delhi High Court. The High Court set aside the District Court's order and dismissed the mother's case, citing:

  1. Lack of Jurisdiction, as Kush was allegedly not "ordinarily residing" in Delhi.

  2. Principle of Comity of Courts, ruling that custody issues should be decided by the American court since all parties were U.S. citizens.

The present appeal was filed against the High Court's judgment.

Issues

1. Jurisdiction: Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the custody petition on the grounds that the Delhi court lacked jurisdiction (i.e., whether the child was "ordinarily residing" in Delhi).

2. Comity of Courts: Whether the High Court correctly declined to exercise jurisdiction based on the principle of comity of courts.

3. Welfare of Minor: What arrangements were in the best interest of the child.

Rule

In matters concerning the welfare of minors, Indian courts, while recognizing the principle of comity of courts, must ultimately exercise their inherent jurisdiction to conduct an independent examination of the facts. Foreign judgments and orders are considered only as one of the many factors, but the paramount consideration remains the child's welfare.

Held

The Supreme Court:

• Jurisdiction (Ordinary Residence): Examined the expression "ordinarily resides" under the Guardians and Wards Act. Drawing on precedents (Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India), the Court held that the term implies a general, settled, and habitual residence, determined by intention and fact.

  • Based on the father's own communications and the child's continuous residence and enrollment in a school in Delhi for nearly three years, the Court concluded that the minor was ordinarily residing in Delhi.

  • Consequently, the Delhi court did have jurisdiction under Section 9(1) of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890.

• Comity of Courts: Held that the principle of comity does not mandate that foreign judgments are automatically conclusive in India.

  • Indian courts must conduct an independent inquiry into the welfare of the minor. The High Court's dismissal based solely on comity was deemed improper.

• Welfare of the Child: Considered the child's current environment:

  • Kush had been living in India and attending a reputable school for nearly three years.

  • The child appeared happy and settled and expressed no desire to return to America.

  • Noting the father's remarriage, the Court found that repatriating the child to the United States was not a suitable option and would disturb his settled life.

• Visitation Rights: The Court criticized the mother for influencing the child to dislike the father. It emphasized that the involvement of both parents is crucial for the child's healthy development.

  • The Court affirmed interim custody with the mother but granted specific visitation rights for the father, instructing the mother to allow and encourage telephonic and video contact between the father and the child.

The Appeal was Allowed, setting aside the High Court's order and upholding the jurisdiction of the Delhi court.

Commentary

"Most Intimate Contact" and Jurisdiction

This judgment solidified the Indian Supreme Court's approach to international child custody conflicts, preferring the jurisdiction of the state that has the "most intimate contact" with the issues arising in the case, a principle previously highlighted in V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India.

While the Ravi Chandran case ultimately ordered the child's return to the U.S. (where the child was only temporarily removed), the Ruchi Majoo case demonstrates the distinction:

• Removal vs. Settled Life: Where the child has been removed only recently (as in Ravi Chandran), the court often prefers a return based on comity and deterring abduction.

• Ordinary Residence/Settled Life: Where the child has established an ordinary residence and a settled, habitual life in India for a significant period (nearly three years in Ruchi Majoo), the paramount consideration of the child's welfare overrides the foreign court's order. The Indian court then assumes jurisdiction as the most appropriate forum (forum conveniens).

The Ruchi Majoo decision is a strong statement that in custody disputes, the constitutional imperative of protecting the child's welfare supersedes rigid adherence to the principle of comity.