D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1955 SC 334)

Facts of the Case

The dispute centered on a capitation fee structure implemented in the State of Madhya Bharat (now part of Madhya Pradesh).

• Initially, all students from Madhya Bharat were exempted from paying the capitation fees.

• A new rule was introduced, granting exemption only to "bona fide residents" of Madhya Bharat.

• The term "bona fide resident" was defined broadly to include:

  • Citizens whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat and haven't acquired domicile elsewhere.

  • Citizens who have acquired domicile in Madhya Bharat and resided there for at least 5 years.

  • Persons who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948, and intend to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently.

  • Persons or classes of persons declared eligible by the Madhya Bharat Government.

• The present petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, challenging this rule.

Issue

Whether the rule imposing a capitation fee on non-residents of Madhya Bharat while exempting bona fide residents violates Articles 14 (Right to Equality) and 15(1) (Prohibition of Discrimination) of the Indian Constitution.

Rule

• Article 15(1): The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them.

• Domicile is a distinct legal concept, separate from the place of birth. Discrimination based on domicile/residence is generally not prohibited by Article 15(1) as the prohibited ground is specifically "place of birth."

Held

The Supreme Court:

• Addressed the petitioner's primary argument that the rule discriminates based on place of birth, which is prohibited by Article 15(1).

• Rejected the argument, holding that the rule, as modified, did not violate Article 15(1) because it granted exemption based on bona fide residence/domicile in Madhya Bharat, not solely on the place of birth.

• Differentiated between domicile and place of birth, noting that domicile refers to one's permanent home and is not necessarily the same as the place of birth.

• Cited authoritative texts (Dicey's) and case law to reinforce this distinction:

  • Winans v. Attorney-General (1904 A.C. 287): Cited Lord McNaughten's observations to clarify that the concept of "domicile of birth" is different from the physical place of birth.

  • Udny v. Udny (1869 L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441): Cited Lord Westbury's statement distinguishing between a person's political status (citizenship) and civil status (domicile) at birth.

• Addressed the argument that there cannot be a domicile of a State (e.g., Madhya Bharat) under the Constitution. The Court referenced Mcmullen v. Wadsworth (1889) 14 A.C. 631 to suggest that "domicile" can sometimes be understood in a non-technical, popular sense as residence.

• Further reasoned that because the Constitution grants power to both Union and State Legislatures to legislate on subjects like marriage and succession, different areas within India could potentially have different systems of personal law, allowing for the concept of a domicile of a State.

• Concluded that the exemption from capitation fees was based on bona fide residence (interpreted as domicile with intent), which is a permissible classification, and not on the prohibited ground of place of birth.

• The petition was dismissed, ruling that the rule did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination.

Commentaries

This judgment is pivotal as it affirmed that classification based on residence or domicile is not the same as classification based on the unconstitutional ground of place of birth under Article 15(1).

Constitutional Privileges for Residents

This concept of linking specific privileges to residence was present elsewhere in the Constitution as well:

• The Constitution itself conferred certain privileges to the “permanent residents” in the State of Jammu & Kashmir [Article 35A] and Andhra Pradesh [Article 371B(2)(c)(ii)].

Note: In 2019, due to the abrogation of Article 370, Article 35A was also revoked.