Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain (AIR 1955 SC 36)

Facts of the Case

The case arose from events immediately following the Partition of British India in 1947.

• Ram Narain, representing his firm Ram Narain Joginder Nath, was granted a cash credit limit by the Central Bank of India Ltd. in Mailsi, Multan District (which became part of Pakistan).

• On August 15, 1947, Ram Narain owed the bank over Rs. 1,40,000, with pledged stocks (cashew nuts) worth approximately Rs. 1,90,000.

• Due to post-partition disturbances, bank officials left Mailsi. It was discovered in January 1948 that 801 cotton bales pledged by Ram Narain were stolen and sold in November 1947.

• The East Punjab Government sanctioned Ram Narain's prosecution under Sections 380 and 454 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for offences committed in Pakistan.

• Ram Narain objected, arguing he was a Pakistani national/domiciled in Pakistan at the time of the offence, making the sanction invalid.

• The High Court of Punjab quashed the charges, holding that Ram Narain could not be tried in India for offences committed in Pakistan.

The present appeal was filed against the High Court's orders.

Issue

Whether a person accused of an offence committed in a district that became part of Pakistan after the partition of India could be tried in an Indian court after migrating to India and acquiring citizenship.

Rule

• Section 4, Indian Penal Code (IPC): Extends the applicability of the IPC to offences committed outside India by Indian citizens.

• Section 188, Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC): Allows for the prosecution of Indian citizens for offences committed outside India, provided they are found within India.

• Determination of Domicile and Citizenship: The determination of a person's domicile and subsequent citizenship at the time of the offence is crucial for establishing the jurisdiction of Indian courts.

Held

The Supreme Court:

• Emphasized that both the intention to reside permanently (animus) and actual residence (factum) are necessary to establish domicile.

• Found that despite his intention to migrate to India, Ram Narain's domicile was still considered to be in Pakistan at the time of the offence (November 1947). The chaotic conditions post-partition and the resultant displacements made it difficult to ascertain a permanent, settled intention to change domicile.

• Concluded that because Ram Narain was domiciled in Pakistan at the time of the offence, the East Punjab Government lacked the jurisdiction to sanction his prosecution for offences committed in Pakistan.

• The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision that Ram Narain could not be tried in India for those specific offences.

Commentary Note

Extension of Code to Extra-Territorial Offences

The principle of jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad often hinges on the nationality or status of the accused at the time of the crime.

As stated by HALSBURY in Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. II, para 87, p. 62):

"British subjects who commit offences abroad are in numerous instances by virtue of statutes amenable to English criminal jurisdiction. Exceptionally aliens also are liable to be tried in England."

This highlights that for extraterritorial application of law (like IPC Section 4), the status of the accused (e.g., citizenship/domicile) is the primary nexus establishing jurisdiction.

In a similar case, the Supreme Court addressed jurisdiction where an offence was committed abroad:

The appellant's son was married to the complainant, and the appellant was indisputably a Mauritius citizen. The alleged offence of mental torture and physical harassment occurred in Kuwait. When a complaint petition was filed in India, the appellant filed an application for quashing of proceedings on the ground that the cognizance taken by the magistrate was bad in law as the alleged offence was committed in Kuwait, and she was a foreign citizen.

The Supreme Court held that the entire proceedings having been initiated illegally and without jurisdiction and actions taken by courts are liable to be nullified. The court also observed that even the principle of res judicata will not apply to such cases initiated without jurisdiction.